Adding an external force results in less strict conditions for cooperation to be favored. A slight enforcement of ALLC can only promote cooperation when there is weak network reciprocity. The catalyst effect of TFT on cooperation is verified. Stable coexistence of the three strategies, ALLD, TFT and ALLC, can be observed. a r t i c l e i n f o 
Introduction
Network reciprocity has been shown to be an important mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Network reciprocity is the generalization of spatial reciprocity (Nowak and May, 1992) to evolutionary graph theory (Lieberman et al., 2005; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006a,b; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Szabó and Fáth, 2007) . In contrast to deterministic dynamics in infinitely large and well-mixed populations, evolutionary graph theory assumes that individuals are arranged in a spatial configuration and that interactions between neighboring individuals on this configuration are more likely than between distant individuals. The fitness of individuals is based on interactions with their local neighbors May, 1992, 1993; Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994; Killingback and Doebeli, 1996; Nakamaru et al., 1997; Szabó and Tőke, 1998; van Baalen and Rand, 1998; Brauchli et al., 1999; Mitteldorf and Wilson, 2000; Nowak and Sigmund, 2000; Hauert, 2002; Le Galliard et al., 2003; Hauert and Doebeli, 2004; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; Roca et al., 2009a; Nowak et al., 2010a,b; Wu et al., 2010) . For example, in human populations, social networks involve interpersonal ties where friends interact more often with each other than strangers (Jackson, 2008) . On the other hand, in financial networks (Schweitzer et al., 2009) , links represent business relationships where newly created institutions emulate the successful strategies of other institutions and try to do business with the same partners (Haldane, 2009) . On the microscale, in bacterial communities and multicellular systems, links are physical connections. After a successful cell duplication, the offspring inherit the strategies (genomes) and connections of their parents (Davies et al., 1998; Rainey and Rainey, 2003) .
Specifically, for games on graphs, the individuals of a population are arranged on the vertices of a graph and edges denote who interacts with whom, based on the strategies of the individuals at the vertices. Each individual obtains its payoff by playing a game with all its connected individuals. A number of different updating mechanisms can be used to determine the evolving state of the graph, specifying how the composition of the population changes under natural selection. A considerable body of research has been devoted to this subject (Abramson and Kuperman, 2001; Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Antal et al., 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006a,b; Pacheco et al., 2006; Santos et al., 2006a,b; Szabó and Fáth, 2007; Taylor et al., 2007; Fu and Wang, 2008; Roca et al., 2009b; Tarnita et al., 2009a,b; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010; Fehl et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2012; Cavaliere et al., 2012) . Remarkably, Ohtsuki et al. (2006) derived a simple rule as a good approximation for general graphs according to which natural selection favors cooperation if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by its cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbors, k (i.e., b=c 4 k implies cooperation).
However, the standard assumption underlying evolutionary game dynamics is that players tend to imitate successful players. However, in real-life social evolutionary dynamics, there may be zealous players who stick to one option according to their idiosyncratic preferences, independent of the payoff to them or their peers (Nakajima and Masuda, 2013) . Typically, zealous cooperators in social dilemmas are observed in military services and team sports (Coleman, 1988) , and occasionally in charity campaigns (Masuda, 2012) . In non-game situations, collective social dynamics in the presence of zealots has been examined, for instance, competition between two equally strong opinions in the voter model (Mobilia, 2003; Mobilia et al., 2007; Galam and Jacobs, 2007; Xie et al., 2011; Singh et al., 2012) .
Zealots also seem to be related to evolutionary game dynamics, for example, in the voluntary vaccination behavior of individuals in which the possibility of an epidemic spreading within a population can be checked by a public goods game (Fu et al., 2011) . In such a situation, individuals may behave like zealots in which they try to immunize themselves regardless of the cost of immunization (Liu et al., 2012) . We can observe that some individuals are much more sensitive to disease incidence than average. The presence of very few infected cases would sufficiently stimulate them to adopt protective behaviors in order to avoid infection. In other words, these oversensitive individuals usually have a much higher perceived risk of infection, hence they always ensure that they are vaccinated in the face of an epidemic. These individuals are referred to as committed individuals who are rigid in their opinion on a particular issue. These committed individuals who always adopt a vaccination strategy can be called committed vaccinators (Liu et al., 2012) . The impact of the presence of committed individuals (or zealots) on structurally static networks has been studied previously (Galam and Jacobs, 2007; Galam, 2008; Lu et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2011; Xie et al., 2011; Singh et al., 2012) .
Recent experimental results on humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. Masuda (2012) proposes an evolutionary dynamical model that links these experimental findings to the evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect) zealous cooperators, he shows that zealous cooperators can transform the population to be fully cooperative under standard evolutionary dynamics. Furthermore, Mobilia (2012) considered the evolution under the prisoner's dilemma in a finite well-mixed population composed of a small number of "cooperation facilitators" who increase payoffs to cooperators but not to defectors. This work demonstrated that the presence of a small number of "cooperation facilitators" can effectively enhance the spread of cooperation in a simple model of social dilemmas and prolong the coexistence of competing species. Liu et al. (2012) studied the vaccination dynamics in well-mixed and spatially structured populations with the involvement of committed individuals. They showed that committed individuals, acting as "steadfast role models" in the population, can efficiently avoid the clustering of susceptible individuals and stimulate other imitators to be vaccinated, hence contributing to the promotion of vaccine uptake.
Based on these previous findings, we are interested in the evolutionary dynamics on graphs when cooperation is enforced by certain external constraint, a situation closely related to zealous cooperation in social dilemma games. Indeed, Szabó et al. (2000) have studied a spatially extended evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game by introducing an external force imposing that players always cooperate with a given probability. This effect can be interpreted as an attempt by a government or by any other organization to enforce cooperation among individuals, by forcing some randomly chosen individuals to cooperate with a certain probability. A different interpretation can also be given. Among the players' community, some old players resign and are replaced by younger ones having a different educational background, making them more open to collaboration (Szabó et al., 2000) . More explicitly, we consider a spatial prisoner's dilemma game with two strategies, cooperation (C) and defection (D), to investigate the effect of random adoption (or enforcement) of C strategies. We are interested in the conditions for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Is the effect of external enforcement of cooperation positive or negative? Moreover, the effect of an external force on three repeated strategies is investigated, thus contributing to the theory of the evolution of cooperation.
Models and analyses

A modified 'death-birth (DB)' updating
A population of N individuals with two types A and B are distributed on a regular graph having degree k, that is, each vertex is connected to k other vertices. A modified 'death-birth (DB)' updating rule is used for renewing the network. According to this rule, a randomly chosen individual dies in every time step. Subsequently, the empty site adopts a cooperative strategy with probability p, while with probability 1 À p its neighbors compete for the empty site with success rates proportional to their fitness. Fitness is defined as 1 À w s þ w s P, where the payoff P is the sum of the scores through interactions with all its k neighbors in the graph and w s (0 o w s o 1) determines the intensity of selection. For w s ¼ 1, fitness equals payoff; this scenario describes strong selection. For w s 5 1, the payoff only gives a small perturbation to the overall fitness of an individual, a limit known as weak selection (Nowak et al., 2004) . We assume a large population size N c k and weak selection (w s 5 1).
Pair approximation
We denote p A and p B as the frequencies of A and B in the population respectively. p AA , p AB , p BA and p BB are the frequencies of AA, AB, BA and BB pairs, respectively. Let q ijj denote the conditional probability of an i-player whose adjacent node is occupied by a j player (i; jA fA; Bg). Similarly, one can imagine local frequencies such as q ijjl which represent the conditional probability that the focal player uses strategy i, given that an adjacent player uses strategy j and that a two-step adjacent player uses strategy l (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006b) . For analytical tractability, we adopt the pair approximation method of Matsuda et al. (1987 Matsuda et al. ( , 1992 and van Baalen (2000), which assumes q ijjl ¼ q ijj . The key assumption is that a two-step adjacent player does not directly affect the focal site. The identities
imply that using pair approximation the whole system can be described by only two variables, p A and q AjA . The payoff matrix is defined as
Next, we calculate the probabilities of the change in the variables p A and p AA during one time step. The procedure we use is similar to the one used by Ohtsuki et al. (2006) .
Updating a B player
A B player is chosen to die with probability p B . Let k A and k B respectively represent the number of A and B players among its k neighbors, which satisfies
BjB . The fitness of each A-player among its neighbors is
Similarly, the fitness of each B-player is
The probability that an A-player replaces the vacancy is given by
Therefore, p A increases by 1=N with probability
Regarding pairs, p AA increases by k A =ðkN=2Þ with probability
Updating an A player
An A player is chosen to die with probability p A . Analogous to the analysis above, the fitness of each A-player is
The probability that one of the B-players replaces the vacancy is given by
Therefore, p A decreases by 1=N with probability
Regarding pairs, p AA decreases by k A =ðkN=2Þ with probability
2.5. Diffusion approximation
We assume that one replacement event takes place within each unit of time. The time derivatives of p A and p AA are
and
We will use the following notation:
We then have
Recall that since the system can be described by p A and q AjA , Eqs. (13) and (14) can be expressed as functions of the two variables, thus yielding the closed dynamical system:
The local density of players, q AjA , equilibrates much faster than the global density, p A , given the condition of weak selection, w s 5 1. Therefore, the dynamical system rapidly converges to the slow manifold, F 2 ðp A ; q AjA ; pÞ ¼ 0. Thus, we have the equation
By inserting p AB ¼ q AjB p B into Eq. (19), this can be rewritten as
More explicitly, through further calculation, we get
This expression tells us that the relationship between q AjA and q AjB is nonlinear, making it difficult to analyze further. Assuming global frequencies as being constant under weak selection, we obtain
From F 3 ¼ 0, the steady state for the local frequency is
Using the relationships described above, the two-variable diffusion process can be analyzed as a one dimensional diffusion process with only single random variable, p A . The fixation probability, Φ A ðyÞ of strategy A with initial frequency p A j t ¼ 0 ¼ y, satisfies the following backward Kolmogorov equation (Ewens, 2004) :
where m(y) and v(y) represent the mean and the variance of an increment of y per unit time, respectively. Through mathematical analysis, the fixation condition of a single cooperator or a single defector can be derived. The details are given in Appendix A.
2.6. The condition b=c 4 k=AðA ¼ 1 þ kp=ð1 À pÞÞ Consider a two-strategy game between cooperator C and defector D, with the following payoff matrix:
Substituting this payoff value into the inequality αþ3β 4 0 (see Appendix A) leads to the conclusion that provided that the condition b=c 4 k=A (where A ¼ 1 þ kp=ð1 ÀpÞ) is satisfied, the fixation probability of a single cooperator will be larger than 
This demonstrates that the external constraint enforced on the graph will favor the fixation of a cooperative strategy in the population. For the two-player, two-strategy game, we consider the value of k=A for different combinations of the parameters p and k (see Table 1 ). This shows that the parameter p will have a monotonic effect on k=A for a specific k value, hence the larger the p, the easier it is for cooperation to be favored. The effect of p is relatively obvious for a large k value, which means that external constraint will have a much more pronounced effect on the evolution of cooperation under weak network reciprocity . This result is expected because strong network reciprocity is beneficial for the evolution of cooperation.
Thus, the effect of external enforcement of cooperation in the case of weak network reciprocity is much more conspicuous.
2.7. A repeated game with three strategies, always defect (ALLD), tit-for-tat (TFT) and always cooperate (ALLC)
In the following, the evolutionary dynamics of three repeated strategies ALLD, TFT and ALLC (Nowak and Sigmund, 1989; Imhof et al., 2005 ) on a graph with the influence of external force are also examined. The following payoff matrix with only one parameter, bð1 ob o 2Þ (Nowak and May, 1992) , will be used:
According to Eq. (28), by introducing another parameter w which represents the probability that the same two players interact in the following step as well, the payoff matrix of the strategies can be derived as follows, with its elements defined as fa i;j gði; j A f1; 2; 3gÞ
Three types of players are assumed to be distributed on the regular graphs. One individual is randomly chosen to die, following which the empty site will be occupied by an ALLC player with probability p, while with probability 1 À p it will be occupied by one of its neighbors proportional to their fitness. Using a similar analysis to the previous section and by referring to the work of Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006b) , the dynamics of the system can be described as
where i A f1; 2; 3g, 1, 2 and 3 represents ALLD, TFT and ALLC, respectively:
Since the system is constrained on the simplex x 1 þ x 2 þx 3 ¼ 1, in conjunction with the payoff matrix Eq. (29), the dynamics can be described by only two free variables, x 2 and x 3 , as follows:
kðk À1Þ x 3 ð1 À x 2 Àx 3 Þ The data show that the effect of p is obvious for weak network reciprocity, where p denotes the probability of cooperation by external enforcement and k is the average degree of a graph, A ¼ 1 þ kp=ð1À pÞ. 
Using Mathematica, the equilibria of the system were calculated numerically, and Jacobian matrix analysis was performed to investigate the stability of the equilibria. The details are given in Appendix B.
Numerical simulations
In previous work, the dynamical outcome of the system without considering an external force was identified to be one of the two cases: coexistence of ALLD and TFT or coexistence of ALLC and TFT (Zhang et al., 2009) . Using this as a starting base, simulations were carried out to study the effect of external enforcement. These simulations indicate that the equilibria of the system may change dramatically even for very small p. Fig. 1 shows an example of this, with p taking values of different orders of magnitude.
A surprising result is observed for some large values ofb and small values of w. In these cases, with increasing levels of external enforcement the cooperation state will change coexistence of all three strategies before eventually becoming a mixed state of coexistence of ALLD and ALLC. For example, the case of w ¼ 1=3 is illustrated in Fig. 1a (1)-f(1). The larger the p, the larger the proportion of ALLD. The ALLC and TFT mixed state may disappear for a relatively small p value (e.g. p¼ 0.0001 as in Fig. 1b(1) ). Without considering an external force, the phase plane is approximately separated into two parts, with trajectories originating from the attraction region of ALLD eventually converging to the equilibria on the TFT and ALLC edges. A similar edge. A similar behavior is observed for trajectories which start from the upper part of the phase plane. With increasing p, an interior focus which represents coexistence of the three strategies grows and all trajectories approach it by forming a rotating cycle. The location of the stable point gradually moves toward the ALLC and ALLD edge. Finally, this stable point becomes situated on the ALLC and ALLD edge once p becomes relatively large. Therefore, a state of pure cooperation will not be favored any longer with increasing p, contrary to expectations. During the process, although the frequency of ALLC becomes large, the proportion of ALLD also grows with a reduction in TFT frequency when the external force is not strong. In the absence of an external force, a state of complete cooperation eventually becomes a state of coexistence of ALLC and ALLD.
Moreover, for a much smaller w, such as the value of 7/33 (see Fig. 1a (2)-f(2)), as p increases, the stable state of the system changes from coexistence of ALLD and TFT to an interior stable node representing coexistence of all three strategies and then eventually to the coexistence of ALLD and ALLC. An increase in the frequency of ALLC is also observed, while TFT disappears completely for a large value of p. Around the stable node, there is a dark area in the phase plane where there is a dense concentration of trajectories. However, the change in the frequency of ALLD is not monotonous as p increases. We observe that the frequency of ALLD first increases, then decreases, but it is still larger than in the case where there is no external force. Therefore, a relatively small p value can increase the proportion of ALLD, although ALLC benefits from an external force. This reveals that cooperation can be favored under such parameter settings, provided that the external force of ALLC is very strong (ALLD always dominates for a small amount of ALLC, unless the compulsory strength of ALLC is extremely strong). Summarizing the two cases above, enforcement of ALLC by an external force inhibits the evolution of cooperation when the external force is not strong. Although the phenomenon seems to be counter-intuitive, the reason is that ALLC is a strong catalyst for ALLD, and ALLD dominates ALLC. Under such a spatial setting, the union of ALLC clusters can resist invasion of ALLD, yet some ALLC individuals which leave the group can easily be invaded by ALLD. Although TFT can also resist an invasion from ALLD, this effect is weakened because the enforcement of ALLC reduces the frequency of TFT in the population. Therefore, a slight enforcement of ALLC is not enough for selection to favor cooperation. This effect is much more obvious under strong network reciprocity, because the evolutionary dynamics are mainly determined by the local configuration.
However, we should note that for the second case above, the interior stable node will not appear always with increasing p. For weak network reciprocity (large k), external constraint (increasing p) can also cause the state of coexistence of ALLD and TFT to change into the state of stable coexistence of ALLD and ALLC. Furthermore, the frequency of ALLC increases simultaneously as p increases. Clearly, this shows that trajectories originally approaching ALLD and TFT change direction by moving to the ALLD and ALLC edge (see Fig. 1a(3)-f(3) ). This demonstrates that cooperation will be promoted by natural selection. The reason for this is that the frequency of TFT is very small when reaching a stable state under this situation. When the external force is removed, the role of TFT in resisting an invasion of ALLD is negligible. Thus, the effect of an external force is straightforward and shows that there is no state where all three strategies stably coexist.
Finally, in order to distinguish the different roles that ALLC and TFT play in the evolutionary dynamics, more simulations were performed by letting the external force to act on TFT. These simulations show that once the compulsory force is applied on TFT, cooperation will always be promoted no matter what the parameters are (see Fig. 2 ). In comparison to the enforcement of ALLC, this demonstrates the importance of the catalyst effect of TFT on the evolution of cooperation. This makes sense since cooperation can only prevail if the fraction of individuals which play TFT is high enough.
Conclusions and discussion
The goal of this study was to investigate the effect of external enforcement on the evolution of cooperation in social networks. External constraint denotes the case where a vacant site on a network adopts a particular strategy with a predefined probability. This behavior can be linked to zealots in social dilemmas and has been shown to change the evolutionary outcome to some extent (e.g. Masuda, 2012; Mobilia, 2012; Liu et al., 2012) . In this paper, we used a simple framework to study deterministic evolutionary dynamics in conjunction with external enforcement. Eq. (28) is a generalization of the standard replicator equation on graphs Nowak, 2006a, 2006b) , including the possibility that the outcome of the evolutionary dynamics also depends on external constraint.
First, the study showed that adding an external force to the basic two-player game results in less strict conditions for cooperation to be favored. Simply put, this condition is b=c 4 k=AðA ¼ 1 þ kp=ð1 À pÞÞ, where p 5 1 is required. Compared to the classical result, the weight kp=ð1 À pÞ also plays a role here. This means that the efficiency of selection will be promoted for a large k value and a relatively large p value, while satisfying p 5 1. That is to say, the effect of enforcement of cooperation is much more obvious under weak network reciprocity. External enforcement of cooperation will benefit the evolution of cooperation, as expected. This conclusion is consistent with the work by Liu et al. (2012) .
Second, a particular example that arises in the context of direct reciprocity was investigated. In well-mixed populations, the random introduction of a small number of TFT strategies will change a pure defection state to a bistable state where cooperation can be favored (Imhof et al., 2005) . Under spatial structure, the DB updating rule will promote the evolution of cooperation involving the three repeated strategies. Pure cooperation, as well as the coexistence of ALLD and TFT, is possible (Zhang et al., 2009 ). This result, confined by the three strategies, not only is a special case but also belongs to direct reciprocity in structured populations, as van Veelen et al. (2012) summarized that natural selection favors cooperation, provided that the repeated game is combined with an intermediate population structure. Specifically, the effect of the presence of constraint makes the dynamics of the system more diverse, depending on the parameter values. The presence of the constraint on ALLC may reduce the frequency of cooperators if p is not too large under strong network reciprocity. Pure cooperation will never evolve unless external constraint of ALLC is strong enough. Moreover, a state of pure cooperation can be reached provided that the compulsory force is applied on TFT. The result can be interpreted in the context of a social society: some enforcement can lead to an undesired result betraying its original intention. This is similar to the research by Szabó et al. (2000) in which they have shown that externally enforcing collaboration does not always produce the desired result.
Third, an interesting phenomenon of the coexistence of all three strategies can appear on regular graphs when external constraint is introduced into the system. The coexistence equilibrium of the three strategies can be a focus or a node, depending on the parameter values, which cannot be observed in well-mixed populations or in the situation with only spatial structure but no external constraint. Imhof et al. (2005) have analyzed mutation selection dynamics in finite populations and found evolutionary oscillations among all three strategies. Brandt and Sigmund (2006) also investigated competition of discriminating altruists with defectors based on the three strategies, where the dynamics exhibit various forms of rock-paper-scissors cycles and depend in subtle ways on noise in the form of errors in the implementation. Szöllősi and Derényi (2008) found that evolutionary cycles of cooperation, defection and reciprocity can be maintained not only by mutation, but also by population structures with hierarchical levels of mixing. Recently, Chatterjee et al. (2012) explored the situation where the population is heterogeneous in terms of learning abilities. They showed that coexistence among the three strategies can arise if the fraction of learning in strategies with a one-bit memory is high and the benefit-to-cost ratio is intermediate. Our result offers an interpretation for the maintenance of cooperation, where TFT plays an important role, as reported by Imhof and Nowak (2010) . They indicated that TFT is a weak catalyst for the emergence of cooperation, while ALLD is a strong catalyst for the emergence of defection.
Our work also makes a small contribution towards understanding cooperation among humans. This is of course an extremely complex topic as diverse factors including social, physiological, and emotional are involved. However, the essence of conditional strategies under social networks can be summarized in one sentence recipe of human cooperation: "a strong dose of repetition and a pinch of population structure" (van Veelen et al., 2012) . Recently, the evolution of extortion in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game has been investigated by Hilbe and co-workers where they have shown that extortioners can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation in reasonably large populations (Hilbe et al., 2013) . Stimulated by this point of view, further interesting studies are expected to expand this theme in the evolution of cooperation.
In the present work, we investigated external enforcement in populations with simple spatial structure only for regular graphs. However, it is known that social interaction networks also display community structure, a kind of assortative structure where individuals are divided into groups where members within a group are mostly connected to each other (Newman, 2012) . How such realistic features of social networks that are affected by external constraint remain unexplored to a large extent. Further, other complex learning rules could also be taken into account when individuals make decisions. Work along these directions is in progress.
Within the short time interval Δt, we have
ðA:2Þ Therefore,
ðA:4Þ which derives
ðA:5Þ
Here, For large N, we have ρ B o1=N if and only if α þ 3β 4 0.
Appendix B
The system has three equilibria ð0; 0; 1Þ; ð1 Àx 3 ; 0;x 3 Þ; ð1 Àx 2 Àx 3 ; x 2 ; x 3 Þ.
Let w s ðk þ 1Þðk À 2Þ 2 =kðk À 1Þ ¼ C, ðk þ 1 Àbð1 À wÞÞ=ð1 À wÞðk þ 1Þ
ðk À 2Þ ¼ C 1 , ðk þ 1 ÀbÞ=ð1 À wÞðk þ 1Þðk À2Þ ¼ C 2 , the system Eqs. (33) will be ðB:5Þ
The eigenvalues of the matrix is λ 1 ¼ Àp, λ 2 ¼ ÀCð1 À pÞðð1 ÀbÞ= ð1 À w þ C 2 ÞÞ þ p. Thus, the equilibrium is a stable point if λ 2 o 0, or else a saddle point if λ 2 4 0.
(ii) For the equilibrium ð1 Àx 3 ; 0;x 3 Þ, Jacobian matrix will be ðB:6Þ
Two eigenvalues are λ 1 ¼ Cð1 ÀpÞð1 Àx 3 Þððð1 ÀbÞ=ð1 À wÞÞx 3 þ C 1 Þ À p, λ 2 ¼ Cð1 À pÞð1 Àx 3 Þðð2ð1 ÀbÞ=ð1 À wÞÞx 3 þ C 2 Þ.
Because of the messy expression ofx 3 , we cannot get any direct insight into the stability of this equilibrium, thus numerical simulations were performed.
(iii) For the equilibrium ð1 Àx 2 À x 3 ; x 2 ; x 3 Þ, the expression for the Jacobian matrix is very complicated, we do not give this expression here. Numerical simulations were also performed for this case.
